Abstract. We consider a resource access control scenario in an open multi-agent system. We specify a mutable set of rules to determine how resource allocation is decided, and minimally assume agent behaviour with respect to these rules is either selfish or responsible. We then study how a combination of learning, reputation, and voting can be used, in the absence of any centralised enforcement mechanism, to ensure that it is more preferable to conform to a system norm than defect against it. This result indicates how it is possible to leverage local adaptation with respect to the Rules of Social-Exchange, Choice, and Order to promote a 'global' system property.
Introduction
We are interested in engineering multi-agent systems for applications which require that the system be:
-open: in the sense of Artikis et al. [1] where agents are opaque, heterogeneous, may be competing, and may have conflicting goals; -fault-tolerant: agents may not conform to the system specification, but the system should maintain operation, and demonstrate autonomic recovery; -volatile-tolerant: agents may join and leave the system, but the 'system' itself remains recognisably the same even if all the components change; -accountable: who performed which action, and to what effect, is significant, so social relations like trust, reputation, responsibility, liability and sanction are all significant; -decentralised: there is no central mechanism for either knowledge or control, no agent is guaranteed to have full knowledge of the entire system or control over the behaviour of all other components; -ruled by law: there is a theoretical limit on those making decisions affecting the constraints and/or requirements of behaviour of other components; -mutable: there is a mechanism by which the specification itself can be changed by the expressed consent of the participants.
Our approach to satisfying these requirements is based on organised adaptation of agent societies. By an agent society we mean a formal specification of:
-A set of social constraints (physical capabilities, institutional powers, norms (permissions, obligations, and prohibitions), sanctions, and enforcement policies) -A communication language -A social structure (roles and the relationships between roles) -Other socio-cognitive relations between agents (e.g., in particular, trust).
By organised adaptation we mean the intentional modification of such a specification to achieve a commonly-understood goal. This requires understanding what can be adapted (for example, the set of social constraints, or individual behaviour wrt. to that set); when to adapt; how to adapt (e.g. by voting); and evaluating the outcomes of adaptation. This is a wide-ranging programme of research, but within this paper we focus attention primarily on the adaptation of social constraints and relations with respect to the agent population to address the issue of fault tolerance (as here understood). We define these constraints in terms of the Rules of Social-* :
-Rules of Social Exchange -The rules pertaining to the communication and interaction of individual agents with one another in the society (eg. gossiping) [2, 3] -Rules of Social Choice -The rules defining how agents' preferences and beliefs can be aggregated (eg. elections and voting protocols) [4, 5] -Rules of Social Order -Where the system characterises the permissions, obligations and (institutional) powers of each agent (eg. rights to system resources) [1, 5, 6] We start from a scenario with multiple agents providing/consuming resources to/from a central repository. However, the set of resources requested is more than those available for distribution, so we define a set of social constraints which determine which agent is allocated resources. Depending on how 'sociably' the agents act during this negotiation, the system may be destroyed, either by agents becoming dissatisfied and leaving the system, or by the over-consumption of resources.
In this scenario, the allocation of resources is decided by a vote. However, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [7] states that any non-dictatorial voting method can be manipulated by agents expressing a false set of preferences. Voters are therefore capable of either responsible or selfish behaviour, and have the option to choose between the two. But in a system with no social constraints, it is likely that they will objectively find that selfish behaviour yields a higher short-term return.
This suppression of collaboration has been widely studied in game theory as the Prisoner's Dilemma, but can be avoided if agents' reputations affect their global social standing [8] . As such, we present in this paper an agent endowed with a reputation monitor based on voting histories, a learning algorithm, and gossiping protocol. With these tools, we show that by adapting the Rules of Social-*, it is possible to ensure that, in the absence of any central enforcement mechanism, it is more preferable (in the long run) to comply with a set of norms than it is to violate them. For an open system, which any agent should be able to participate in, this is an important requirement for long term stability.
In the next section, we describe the basic scenario and multi-agent system in more detail. In Section 3 we describe the three primary mechanisms used in this paper: the exploration/learning method, the reputation mechanism, and election protocol. Section 4 describes experimental results from a 'society' of fifty agents implemented in the PreSAGE platform [9] . We discuss some related work and draw some conclusions in Section 5. In particular, we note that just by making the assumption of responsible or selfish behaviour (i.e. without compromising the assumption of heterogeneity), individual learning algorithms can be employedand improved with gossiping -to facilitate the successful induction of a newcomer into an open agent society.
Background

Scenario and Multi-Agent System
The scenario is based on a 'tragedy of the commons' situation based on the scenario presented in [10] . We also present the animation/simulation platform which we have used to implement the system: further details of the platform can be found in [9] .
There is a set of agents U , interacting during an infinite sequence of time slices t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n , . . .; with each agent requiring, at each time slice, access to resources stored in a bank B.
At each time slice, an agent may be present or absent: the set of agents present at any t is denoted by A t , A t ⊆ U . To satisfy each of their individual goals, each agent a ∈ A t offers, at each time slice, an allocation of resources O a t for B, and requests, at each time, an allocation of resources R a t from B. We stipulate that, for all a ∈ A t , R Clearly, not all of the requests can be satisfied without 'bankrupting' the system. Therefore, at each t, the set of present agents A t take a vote on who should have their resource request satisfied. If an agent a receives a number of votes greater than or equal to a threshold τ t then its request is granted. The problem then is that:
-If τ is too low, too many resources will be distributed, which this will result in the "Tragedy of the Commons" as the system is bankrupted; -If τ is too high, too few resources will be distributed, which this will result in "voting with their feet" as dissatisfied agents leave the system.
The challenge then is for the agents to agree -again by a vote -a new value for τ in time slice t + 1 based on their prediction of how many agents will be present, available resources, and so on. In other words, they are adapting the Rules of Social Choice, specifically: the resource controller is obliged to grant access to the resource to a requester, if the number of votes for the requester is greater than or equal to τ by manipulating the value of τ . We define responsible behaviour to be recognised as voting for an a value of next-τ which will not bankrupt the system or under distribute resources. Formally, the external state of the multi-agent system M is specified, at a time-slice t, by:
where:
U = the set of agents A t ⊆ U, the set of present agents at t ρ t : U → {0, 1}, the presence function s.t. ρ t (a) = 1 ↔ a ∈ A t B t : Z, the 'bank', indicating the overall system resources available τ t : N, the threshold number of votes to be allocated resources
The resource allocation function f t is constructed by:
where v b t : (. . .) → A t is the expressed preference (vote) of agent b in time-slice t, whose inputs are local parameters (in particular agents' reputations) and whose output is a preference array of agents in A t . This second vote is the mechanism which agents use to decide on who is empowered and permitted to receive and use resources this round, and is therefore an adaptation of the Rules of Social Order.
Simulation/Animation Platform
To animate this system and experiment with different agent behaviours, we have used the agent society animation/simulation platform PreSAGE [9] . PreSAGE is a rapid prototyping tool whose emphasis is on the simulation of agent societies and the social relationships between agents, intended to facilitate the study of the social behaviour of components, the evolution of network structures, and the adaptation of conventional rules. To develop a prototype, it is necessary to define agent participant types: this can be done by extending the abstract class supplied with PreSAGE (to guarantee compatibility with the simulation calls and provide core functionality like message handling etc.) or by defining a new class.
To define the participant class for our purposes, we extend the PreSAGE abstract participant with the following data and functions (we drop the superscript a since it is implicit from context):
voting function which maps a list of agents' historical actions, to an ordered list of agents A p representing a preference array
The combination of the reputation tracking, norm evaluation and voting are defined in section 3 as the tools we use to show how we can harness peer pressure in the system. Each time slice sees each active agent follow the system cycle:
each agent a ∈ A t uses π a to propose and vote on a value for τ t Phase 2: resource request each agent a ∈ A t offers resources O a t , and requests resources R a t each agent a ∈ A t computes reputation values for each agent b ∈ A t Phase 3: resource assignment each agent a ∈ A t uses v a to vote for a vector of agents comprised of a ∈ A t f t is computed from the votes cast and τ t Phase 4: update B t is updated according to the resources allocated each agent updates its satisfaction rating (see below) each agent updates its utility histories for each Norm for reinforcement learning Phase 4 is where an agent evaluates its personal success and potentially changes its behaviour to try to improve its standing. In section 3, we elaborate in more detail how our participants use the norm evaluation and reputation monitors towards this goal.
Related Research
Although the use of learning techniques to change system parameters is addressed in [12, 13] , the scenario described here defines an institution to be the sum of its participants rather than a separate entity. If we define this system as a set of agents forming an institution, it should be emphasised that the only 'universal' 1 truth in M t is the existence of an agent. All other social constructions exist as projections of a composite of the beliefs of the population.
Normally we would begin by defining the existence of an agent in propositional logic, and construct the institutional facts from this basis.
First Order Logic
Set Theory
In this formalisation however, we have considered the concept of membership of the institution (a ∈ U ) and the propositional fact agent(a) to be equivalent. This should not be confused with membership of the temporal sub group of U , i.e. a ∈ A t which is an institutional fact rather than a brute fact. This can be illustrated if we assume all participants believe a to be active in time slice t. If a did not share this belief, relative to the institution it would still be true, including all the implicit sanctions regarding unfulfilled obligations.
Therefore if an agent is empowered by an institution norm to perform a speech act in the sense of Jones et al. [11] we should not infer the institution is tangible, the institution exists only as a marker to supply context. If agents believe these norms to be true, then relative to their perception they are. In another example, although we have referred to 'the bank' as an external agency, a physical exchange of resources never takes place, the fact that agents believe the resource has changed hands is sufficient. Whether the resource itself takes physical form and is centralised is a separate problem, as it is only entities that hold beliefs about the institution which make up a society.
The research most closely aligned with the current work is the foundational work of Axelrod [14] on the evolution of norms 2 . In this work, he posited a norms game, in which an individual has an opportunity to defect against a norm, as determined by its propensity to boldness. If it defects, then it gets a positive payoff, and all the others get a negative one. A defecting agent may or may not be seen (to defect); if it is seen by another agent then the agent may choose to punish or not, as determined by its propensity to vengefulness. If it chooses to punish then the punished agent (the defector) gets a large negative outcome, and the punishing agent a small negative outcome (i.e. there is a cost associated with enforcing a norm).
Axelrod ran computer simulations where the population changes over a sequence of generations, whereby those agents with more successful boldness/venge-fulness strategies produce more descendants than less successful ones (keeping a fixed population size). The outcome was, starting from an average level of boldness and vengefulness: first boldness fell, because it was costly to be bold when vengeance was (relatively high); then vengefulness fell, as was is costly to be vengeful without direct benefit; then boldness rose sharply, destroying the restraint originally shown -as Axelrod notes: "a sad but stable state" ( [14] :p1100).
To redress this situation, Axelrod introduced a variant of the game with a metanorm, in this case the punishment of defection may or may not be seen, and not punishing itself may be punished. So there is some incentive to be vengeful. Axelrod simulations now showed that if a population started with 'sufficient' vengefulness the restraint could be maintained, but if not, then the metanorms game collapsed just like the norms game.
To some extent, the scenario in this paper is a partial reconstruction of Axelrod's norms game, with some important variations. The four phases of each time slice are comparable to one path in the norms game, where (Phase 1) the agents vote either selfishly or responsibly (defect or do not defect); (Phase 2) every agent sees what each other agent has done; (Phase 3) agents punish defectors through the reputation mechanism; and (Phase 4) agents update behaviour based on the reinforcement learning (notionally equivalent to the production of the next generation).
However, in our scenario, there are pre-established conventional rules, with a meta-norm enforcing a 'sociable' adaptation of these rules. Therefore we do not deal with generations of agents and the evolution of norms, but with one generation (whose numbers may change, e.g. when a new selfish agent is introduced) and the robustness of its norms wrt. maintaining a stable state in face of potentially disruptive components (i.e. when a new selfish agent is introduced). Our agents do not perform game-theoretic decision making along boldness vs. vengefulness dimensions, but instead express a preference (a vote) based on a larger number of local parameters, thus the internal complexity of our agents, while hidden from general view, is greater than the individual players of Axelrod's game.
Furthermore, the two votes required, one for the value of τ and one for the candidate order, require each agent to express preferences. This signalling introduces an element of communication which side-effects the game, and in combination with the reputation system and learning (individual adaptation) provides the robustness to resist the disruption of selfish agents. Figure 1 illustrates the cycle through which we can maintain a stable system with self-enforcing behaviour using peer pressure. The voting functions and patterns of each agent are public, and will feed into the reputation monitors of each participant. The reputation monitor then generates a list of preferred agents derived from how socially each agent is perceived to be acting. This vote generates a result which depending on a win or loss of resources, drives the learning algorithm of an agent. An agent will then choose a voting behaviour (social or antisocial) which the learning algorithm calculates to give the highest return.
Mechanisms for Peer Pressure
Overview of mechanisms
Reinforcement Learning
Voting 
Voting Functions
As defined in section 2.1, τ will symbolise the threshold number of votes an agent requires from the population to receive resources, and is the metric the agents use to adapt the Rules of Social Choice. In order to select an appropriate value we must ensure that the electorate is not split. To avoid this we select τ using a two round election system where round one consists of suggestions for τ , and round two a vote between the two most popular suggestions. This way even if the responsible voters are split on their suggestions, it is probable that at least one of the popular choices is closer to theirs than a selfish one. Once τ has been decided we can move on to resource requests, offers, and the main vote for who will receive resources this time slice. For simplicity we have fixed the resource requests and offers as we believe the significance of the introduction of a normal distribution would not justify the increase in complexity 3 . We have found a plurality vote in this round to be ineffective for discouraging antisocial behaviour, as the ideal value of τ for a system cycle, tends to be less than or equal to the number of votes that an agent is granted to use. For example if each agent is allowed to vote for two candidates to receive resources, the value of τ which will ensure a stable resource stockpile for a responsible population, tends to oscillate around two. Therefore if we allow agents to use these votes for themselves, selfish behaviour will almost always be rewarded. We need to force agents to be less introspective, as the solution to this problem lies in the opinion an agent has of its neighbours.
To this end we have changed the system's main voting protocol to Borda which requires agents to vote in the form of an ordered preference list 4 . Repetitions in the list will be ignored and incomplete lists will be penalised. Agents behaving selfishly are loyal to no one and will rank themselves before anyone else. Responsible agents however, will conscientiously rank the voters, leaving selfish agents with no extra Borda points. It will therefore be the agents behaving responsibly who will receive on average a larger number of Borda points. The interpretation of a Borda preference array can be viewed in table 1 in which x = the number of agents receiving points; we define this to be approximately half of the total population (ie. |A t |).
Preference Array Vote weight p1 
Reputations and Behaviours
In order to implement a Borda election, agents must diligently rank their neighbours in a preference relation. This requires the use of a reputation monitor which can distinguish between selfish and social behaviour. Then depending on individual reputation values the preference relation can be constructed. Due to their activity profiles agents do not have perfect knowledge of the system. They may rejoin with no reputation information on a number of new agents. It is important that we carefully define how to recognise antisocial behaviour as quickly as possible. The system has therefore been specified in terms of two poles of behaviour, responsible and selfish. Agents behaving responsibly are defined to be altruistic capitalists, putting the needs of the system before their own, but expecting some sort of return for their efforts. The priority lies in avoiding the tragedy of the commons and bankrupting the system. For agents which are attributed the same reputation we make sure to randomise their positions between one another. This can be achieved by basing a preference relation on a random variable which takes the reputation as an input rather than a strict ordering based on historical behaviour.
Agents behaving selfishly are simpler than their responsible counterparts as their duty is only to themselves. They will always vote so that they are first on their preference list and vote for a low value of τ ; increasing the likelihood of receiving resources. These actions cannot be hidden from their neighbours so the gamble is that the 'pro' of voting for oneself will offset the 'con' of a poor social standing. Needless to say, a system comprised solely of selfish agents would bankrupt, so our aim is to create a set of norms that rewards responsible behaviour while punishing selfish.
We define a set of prediction functions randomly initialised and attribute a set to each agent. These predictors are used by the responsible population to calculate the expected optimal τ for the coming time cycle. As the simulation progresses, agents gather historical information on what a good value of τ would have been in the previous timecycles. Agents can evaluate how successful their predictors are and rank functions returning a good estimate of τ opt over less accurate ones.
We employ a set of predictors, each constructed using a randomly weighted average of historical values. We take x i to be a random value between zero and one adhering to a uniform distribution.
where a i refers to the historical values.
The historical information is selected by collating all the votes and ranking the most popular agents. We then hypothetically give each agent resources until all the offered resources have been exhausted. The last agent to receive resources then becomes the benchmark for τ , and we enter the number of votes that it received as the historical τ threshold.
An important duty of the responsible population is to exclude agents which behave selfishly. This meta-norm is key to the peer pressure mechanism, and the sole sanction which we need in order to make it clear to newcomers which behaviours are acceptable. If a sanction for selfish behaviour didn't exist, the responsible agents would observe a higher return for selfish behaviour and consider defecting.
The way in which agents can recognise selfish behaviour lies in the voting for τ . An agent's reputation monitor will consider any neighbour to be selfish if their vote differs by the ratio threshold defined below. For these experiments, we have defined the assumption of selfish behaviour to be when γ > 0.4, but this will vary for different implementations. Note that an agent will immediately be relabelled as 'responsible' if it changes it's voting patterns accordingly, and vice versa. This is in keeping with Axelrod's work on promoting co-operation by immediately punishing and rewarding undesirable and desirable behaviour. Using this dynamic, agents can intelligently adapt the Rules of Social Order to maintain their a 'moral' context of acceptable and non-sanctionable behaviour.
Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning demonstrates how an agent can test and evaluate system norms. With limited prior knowledge of the system an agent can ascertain through trial and error what are the globally acceptable norms. We use a basic exploration learning algorithm, which treats the dialogic framework as a finite state machine. An agent will maintain a history of previous actions and their respective payoffs. Using this information, depending on a random variable linked to an exploration metric, agents will either try to maximise their utility by choosing either by what it believes will been the most lucrative action, or 'explore' by choosing an arbitrary action.
We link the system norms to a set actions x ∈ X in states s ∈ S using the function g(s), with buffers of size m saving reward information r k at time k. The Norm evaluation function can be defined using:
where
Learning takes place during the declaration of the election result. The behaviour currently being used will interpret the list of winners as r ∈ {0, 1}, and will update the history for this action accordingly. In our system we have only two histories to update as we have only one state and two 'actions' representing responsible and selfish behaviour. Behaviour for the next timecycle depends on the exploration metric ε which we have fixed in these experiments to 0.95
This allows a participant to try all possibilities, before eventually settling into what it considers to be a locally optimal behaviour.
In this section we describe how an agent is animated in the system, followed by the experiments which have been run. We include several illustrative examples to underline the effects which peer pressure has on the system, and talk through the social forces that brought it about.
Agent Animation
Agents begin their life cycle with a role assignment we assume to have been established in advance. This can be done through a role assignment protocol as outlined in [5] . The chair of the session then calls for participation in the system, and the voters send confirmation messages. A voter has an activity profile which is linked to a Markov chain, resulting in a stable population, but as mentioned in previous sections they may refuse to participate if they no longer consider the system to be viable. A confirmation of participation is tantamount to a commitment to provide resources in this time slice, regardless of the result.
During the τ selection vote, agents' votes are kept public so they can update their reputation monitors accordingly. The main vote follows from the τ selection by opening a ballot for the agents who voted in the first round. It is at this point that agents need to form their preference arrays and send them to the chair for collation. After a defined time-out the chair will accept no more votes and calculate how many resources are left in the system post distribution. For brevity the optimal value of τ , for use in the prediction functions, is calculated by the chair and circulated with the election results. This reduces the complexity of the system significantly.
Once agents know whether they have received resources this timeslice, they are able to update how successful their state-action pair was this time slice, and adjust their satisfaction rating. Satisfaction is representative of an agent's overall success in the system and is maintained parallel to individual action histories. We define satisfaction to lie between zero and one, and to be governed by the equations:
where the former is used to improve an agent's satisfaction in a society, and the latter to regress it. α and β represent the satisfaction increase and decrease rates respectively.
We have included a gossiping routine, for some preliminary work on adapting the Rules of Social Exchange. This takes the form of sharing election results with one another. Agents can evaluate norms based on personal experience, and the experience of others, resulting in faster learning. These results are however at a preliminary stage, and agents to do not yet vote to change these rules.
Experiments
We have shown in [10] that this experiment is stable amongst a group of these agents who have a pre-established a responsible moral context. We plan to introduce several new populations of agents in an attempt to destabilise the system. These populations will take the form of a control group of responsible agents, a set of purely selfish agents, and finally two sets of learning agents as described in section 3, one which incorporates gossiping and another which doesn't. We will examine how and whether the learning/exploration algorithm works in conjunction with the reputation monitor.
Results
We include here an example of a simulation of 55 agents. We start with a community of 50 responsible and stable agents, and introduce a set of 5 new ones. We have chosen to illustrate the three possible convergences of the system. Either an agent is accepted, excluded permanently, or excluded until they conform to the system norms. The following figures are typical examples of simulation test runs as convergence analyses will take several weeks to compile. Figure 2 shows a control group of responsible agents being added to the system at timecycle 3000. This is to establish a benchmark on how quickly a set of agents will be accepted into the institution when then know in advance which norms to adhere to. It is clear from the graph that for any new population the exclusion mechanisms initially work against them, and that joining this society is a matter of 'speculate to accumulate'. Figure 3 shows another control group of selfish agents being added to the system at timecycle 3000. This demonstrates the efficiency of the exclusion sanctions and the agents' ability to recognise selfishbehaviour. We note that around time cycle 4500 the satisfaction for the selfish agents greatly increases. This is due to a surplus of resources, and a low value of τ opt . Selfish agents who always vote for a low τ become difficult to distinguish from responsible agents. An interesting side note we see that in Figure 3 the average satisfaction goes slightly up for the responsible agents when the selfish agents enter the system. This is because the selfish agents are being excluded from distribution of resources, and are effectively forfeiting their contribution.
Figures 4 and 5 are typical examples of a group of learning agents converging towards responsible behaviour. Figure 4 demonstrates how an agent which only learns based on personal experience of the system will eventually join the responsible population. We see from this typical run that the newcomers become indistinguishable from the original population around timecycle 5000. This is in contrast to Figure 5 , where the convergence is much faster. This is because agents in Figure 5 use gossiping to share information on past successes and failures. This greatly improves the accuracy of the action histories in each agent, and appears to yield a similar convergence rate to the control group. 
Summary of Results
The experiments reported here offer additional supporting evidence for Axelrod's original claims, make their own contribution, and serve as a basis for a successively richer set of experiments in further work. The experiments confirm, as stated by Axelrod, that norms and conventions are a powerful mechanism for resolving conflicts of interest in disputes between multiple parties even in the absence of a central authority. In addition, social norms (e.g. the 'norm' is to vote for a 'reasonable' value of τ ) and social constraints (i.e. the reputation mechanism) work well in preventing minor defections given that the cost of enforcement is low. In their own right, the experiments show how effective it is to give control over the adaptation of rules to those whose outcomes are most directly affected by the adaptation (cf. [15] ), and how it is possible to leverage local adaptation with respect to a set of rules to achieve an intended 'global' system property.
There are several lines of further investigation opened up by this work. One is a more fine-grained behaviour rather than responsible or selfish. Rather, we would have a propensity to selfish behaviour, and correspondingly allow a propensity to punish. This would necessitate a more subtle implementation of forgiveness which is an important element of autonomic systems for selfrepair [16] . A second line of investigation concerns a peer to peer system allowing a more advanced form of 'gossiping' between agents, allowing groups to converge their opinions. For this, we could use the models of opinion formation formalised by [3] .
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have outlined an agent society which maintains fault tolerance through peer pressure. We chose three mechanisms to create this dynamic: The reputation monitor, the reinforcement learning, and the voting functions. The agents used these tools to adapt the Rules of Social-*, out of which emerged emerged a system comprised of responsible agents which when pitted against an unsure population effectively pressurised the latter into their preferred way of behaving (i.e conforming to a norm, in the sense of Axelrod).
Through the platform PreSage, we have shown that a social norm can be enforced in a system with a strong moral pretext without the use of a centralised enforcement agency, given that the cost of enforcement is low or non-existent. However, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of scale (size of population) and the corresponding increased cost of a more centralised enforcement mechanism. For example, in a relatively small society, enforcement could be based on peer-pressure, word-of-mouth or other reputation mechanism (as here) with low or no cost. In a relatively large society where neighbours are governed by a geo-location function, central reputation registers could be provided, with punishment provided by the equivalent of a 'police force', but at a much higher cost.
On a closing note, we also agree with Axelrod [14] when he observes that the probabilistic effects and complexities of population diversity make it difficult (if not impossible) to determine the consequences of a given behavioural model. However, computer simulation techniques offer a viable alternative which can reveal the system dynamics and stable states, as well as specific influence of identified agent behaviour profiles.
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